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LASHERS AND LEVIATHAN: THE 1954 WANKIE COLLIERY STRIKE 
Ian Phimister 
This paper is part of a larger study which examines the history of Zimbabwe's only coal 
mine, Wankie Colliery, between 1894 and 1954. It takes up the story early in 1953 when 
ownership of the Colliery passed from Britain's Powell Duffryn to South Africa's Anglo 
American corporation. 
I 
In January 1953, Wankie was given a thorough going-over by Thomas Coulter, recently 
appointed to Anglo American's executive committee and past chairman of the African and 
European Company. Well-known in mining circles, Coulter's practical knowledge of the 
southern African coal industry was widely regarded as unequalled.1 "As a result of that 
visit", he later recalled, "I recommended that we should make an endeavour to obtain 
control of Wankie."z This was agreed to, and in March, Coulter "flew to London and then 
on to Cardiff to interview Sir Herbert Merrit who was then Chairman of Powell Duffryn."3 
Faced with the daunting prospect of needing to raise development capital totalling more 
than £5 million on a sceptical market, Powell Duffryn was more than willing to hear what 
Anglo American had to say. After two days' talk, the deal was done: "Sir Herbert decided 
that Powell Duffiyn would sell to us all its shares in Wankie in return for an equal value of 
shares in Anglo American."4 
Not everyone was pleased by this latest development in Wankie's chequered career. "Some 
see in it the first sinister fruits of Federation, 'big business', 'vested interests', 'monopolies' 
exploiting the gullible Rhodesian, and so forth", warned one editorial. Given Anglo 
American's "predominant stake in the copper mines", it was feared that "Wankie coal will be 
sent north in such quantities as to cripple Southern RhodesiaW.5 Others, though, were far 
more positive. The Southern Rhodesia government was given what was described as a cast- 
iron guarantee that the "full financial and technical strength of the [Anglo American] 
corporation and its associates will be available to ensure that the Wankie Colliery will 
within two or three years be brought to a position when it can meet the full requirements of 
the territories which it serves".s "They have shown faith in Rhodesia, faith in the Federal 
State", concluded a leading industrial journal, "and they are evidently not scared that 
Kariba and Kafue, which promise to produce power at under one farthing per unit, will put 
Wankie out of business ... Anglo American is virile, rich and successful; and evidently its 
Directors share the belief of most Rhodesians that, if only the socialists and myopic 
churchmen in England will give Central Africa a rest from their foolish meddling, there is 
every prospect of political stability upon which a spectacular economic advance can be 
founded."7 
The last things likely to have been on Anglo American's mind were the concerns of overseas 
socialists and churchmen, its mildly liberal corporate image notwithstanding. A 
Johannesburg-based conglomerate which occasionally demurred at  the cruder racist 
excesses of South Africa's ruling National Party, while simultaneously imposing a grim 
regime of low wages and migrant labour on its own black workforce, Anglo American's 
management skills and production practices had been honed in the coal and gold mines of 
the Rand.8 Both of them were immediately set to work in Southern Rhodesia's only 
colliery. "The first task that confronted us at Wankie", wrote Coulter, "was to get rid of the 
Chairman. Mr Robert Foot, who was, to put it mildly, quite incompetent for the task of 
expanding operations . . . Eventually at a board meeting of the Wankie Company on the 1st 
May 1953, I became Chairman."Q Nor was change confined to the very top. Instead of 
simply replacing existing staff, however, Anglo American initially "ran two systems on one 
mine". Officials who had been on the Colliery's payroll for years woke up to find their 
responsibilities redefined and reduced in scope. T. J. Braithwaite, Powell Duffryn's general 
manager who apparently had "not even been aware of the serious loss of manshifts and low 
efficiency [consequent on the high accident rate]",lo was moved sideways into 
administration, and obliged to share authority with G. F. Rautenbach, brought up from 
South Africa to take charge of the mining side of operations.11 Other senior and middle- 
ranking posts were similarly duplicated, but the "bad feeling" which this caused between 
Anglo American-appointed personnel and staff already at  the Colliery soon faded into 
insignificance compared to the bitter antagonism which the new South African 
dispensation succeeded in generating amongst Wankie's black workers. 12 
High on the list of Anglo American's priorities was accelerated development of the third 
Colliery originally mooted by Powell Duffryn. A capital programme "costing £5,250,000 for 
opening and equipping No. 3 shaft and for general reconstruction" was immediately begun. 
"The raising of this finance together with wiping out a bank overdraft of £900,000 presented 
no difficulties whatever", noted Wankie's new Chairman. "We soon had all the money 
required."ls By 1955 "the capital employed in the business had risen to £9,121,000", a four- 
fold increase in little over five years. Much of this capital was poured into "construction 
and development work at No. 3 Colliery", as well as into "reorganizing No. 1 Colliery and 
remodelling No. 2 Colliery to achieve increased dependable output capacity". It was all 
done, shareholders were assured, "with great drive and diligenceV.l4 "I was working a 12 
hour day every day for about 4 months - Saturday, Sundays - while No. 3 shaft was sunk", 
recalled one mine surveyor. "I was pegging [underground] roads and railways and 
powerlines and boreholes for drillers and putting in grade lines following a 1 in 3 down for 
shafts, a very, very tough period of my life."l5 In much the same period, Wankie's new 
owners brought their fomidable experience to bear on the "need for greater efficiency". 
Between May and December 1953, Rautenbach and other mine officials began exploring 
ways and means of "reorganizing the Colliery's underground Native labour force" in order to 
raise productivity to Transvaal levels.16 They did not have to look far. 
Until the late 1940s, "the system of working underground had remained virtually 
unchanged through Wankie's history". Coal was "blasted off the solid" by charges of 
explosive placed in holes drilled in the coalface. 17 Although slow and wasteful compared to 
other methods of mining coal, the system at Wankie had lasted as long as it had primarily 
because black labour was cheap and plentiful. Such change as subsequently occurred was 
forced on the Colliery by rising costs and an acute shortage of labour, as a result of which 
electrically driven coal-cutting machines were introduced in 1949-50. The coal cutters 
operated by making 
a semi-circular cut in each face Qft. into the coal at the centre and about 6 inches 
deep some 4ft. 6 inches from the floor; thus creating two 'free' faces of coal. These 
faces were then drilled by hand-held electric rotary drills to a pre-determined pattern. 
the holes terminating 6 inches from the back of the 'cut'. The holes were charged 
with explosives and detonators and were fired either electrically or by safety fuse.18 
With undercutting, "less explosive was used, the blast was more effective and coal was 
broken into larger chunks", 19 but as  Anglo American already knew, coal cutters could be 
utilized effectively only in some parts of the existing Colliery complex. Only No. 2 Colliery 
had "the thick coal [seam] in which the best results from mechanization were to be 
expected. The geological faulting so far encountered there was not regarded as "so severe 
as seriously to compromise mechanisation" -20 
At No. 1 Colliery, where some workings dated back almost to the turn of the century, Powell 
Duffryn had simply continued to extract coal in the same bad old way as before. Effort was 
dispersed over a large number of active working faces, and because "blasting off the solid" 
involved lashing boys being employed in turning back the coal to enable the jackhammer 
operators to get to the face to drill another round, this meant double handling in all 
development coal, with a consequent "adverse effect on costsW.21 In both Collieries, 
moreover, all coal, whether initially "blasted down" or undercut, was subsequently loaded 
and transported in exactly the same way. Coal was shovelled or "lashed" into tubs which 
were then pushed or "tramrned" to the nearest section way of the endless rope haulage. 
Once coupled to the haulage, the tubs were pulled to the surface, emptied and returned 
underground. Like others before them. Anglo American soon saw where a large part of the 
problem lay. Output per manshift turned primarily on the number of tubs "lashed". "I 
cannot say that all in all the whole set up of our labour revolves around lashing boys but it 
is very nearly that", the Coal Commission had been told by the Colliery's then mine 
manager in 1949. "It is the bottleneck of the colliery."22 
Although the problem was simple enough to identify, this did not make it any easier to 
resolve. At the end of the 1940s and the start of the 1950s, neither the Wankie Colliery 
Company nor Powell Duffryn had possessed sufficient determination or, more to the point, 
large enough resources to grapple with it in all its manifestations. If production was not to 
be interrupted, then action would be required on several fronts. Unlike its predecessors, 
however, Anglo American had not only the will but also the way to stamp its authority on 
the organization of work underground. In doing so, it pursued several strategies 
simultaneously. Over the longer term, No. 3 Colliery scheduled to come into full production 
in the second half of 1954, was planned and equipped from top to bottom for mechanized 
work. Mechanically developed and won coal would be carried to the surface by the latest in 
belt conveyors. "At the face electrically powered loading machines are employed to gather 
up the coal", explained a later report, "and to deposit it into electrically driven cars having a 
capacity of 8 tons, and these cars carry the coal from the faces to the end of the belt 
conveyor system, where they discharge their load and return again to be filled at the face." 
The elimination of "hand lashing" and conventional rope haulages, Anglo American's 
managers were convinced, was the key both to better productivity and expanded o~tput.23 
But sweeping changes of this kind were only practically possible where completely new 
shafts were being sunk. Compared to the free hand which it enjoyed in developing No. 3 
Colliery, Anglo American's room for manoeuvre was severely circumscribed in Wankie's older 
workings. The South Africans found themselves restricted at virtually every turn by the 
way in which No. 1 and No. 2 Collieries had originally been laid out. Even though some of 
the coal cutting operations which Powell Duffryn had introduced into No. 2 Colliery were 
later augmented by the construction of belt conveyors where the absence of geological 
faulting made this feasible, the number of such "fully mechanised areas" was never large. At  
the end of the decade, they were still the exception to the general rule.24 Everywhere else, 
mining methods were too deeply entrenched and consequently too expensive even for Anglo 
American just to sweep them away. Instead Rautenbach's management team had to make 
the best of a bad job by modifying what they could not change. 
Supervision underground was immediately tightened up. Over the course of the two 
previous decades, the ratio of white supervisors to black labourers had fallen dramatically. 
There were at least two reasons why this had happened. Before serious faulting was 
encountered at the start of the 1940s. Wankie's relatively wide working faces had enabled 
white miners to keep an eye on several gangs of black workers at once, certainly more than 
was normal on gold mines.25 From 1941 onwards, however, "the adverse conditions met 
with underground . . . [caused] the mine's producing faces to become widely distributedv.26 In 
1949 the number of working faces was already "almost too numerous to count".27 But 
although the number of producing coal faces was increasing rapidly, the number of white 
miners was actually falling as first the Wankie Colliery Company and then Powell Duffryn 
tried to economize on white wages. By the time Anglo American took over, the situation 
had deteriorated to the stage where there were between 40 and 50 producing faces in each of 
the ten working areas which together comprised No. 1 and No. 2 Collieries. Spread over 
each working area were c. "100 native workmen", about half of whom were "lashers" and 
jackhammer operators. The remainder were "pushing boys", tshovishas. All of them, that 
is, the 100 or so labourers in each working area, were supposedly supervised by a single 
white miner, helped by two black "boss boysW.28 
Accustomed to Transvaal collieries where "the degree of [underground] control was 
significantly greaterW,29 Rautenbach brought Wankie into line with South African coal- 
mining practice by implementing measures to reduce the enormouns number of producing 
faces. This had the great advantage of increasing the rate of daily advance over small "coal 
getting" areas, at the same time as it facilitated supervision of work gangs.30 He also hired 
more white miners. For the first time in years. "boss boys" were themselves closely bossed. 
"These whites were boers", recalled Mose Kayombo, himself a "boss boy" between 1953 and 
1955. "Their treatment was very tough to a boss-boy when a load of coal didn't come out 
on the surface in t i e  ... it needed extra hard work of supervision to workers for it to be 
completed successfully in a day."31 For ordinary workers, especially lashers, at the 
receiving end of all of this, it was tougher still. White miners, unflatteringly nicknamed by 
the black labourers under them, regularly prowled around the coal producing faces. Siwepu 
(whip), Sando (hammer), Sabule (machete), and Simbaule (poisonous insect), all made their 
presence felt in characteristic ways.32 but none more so than Maboya (hairy one) and 
Madonola (one who beats). Maboya, a huge man who "hit Africans whenever he visited the 
working place", was fond of "lifting workers with one hand and shaking them so that they 
would work harderW,33 while Madonola was feared throughout No. 2 Colliery "because he 
never hesitated to strike an erring native". "Munthu mnyama minazi donola wena (I'll beat 
the shit out of you, you black ...lw, he was notorious for shouting at black workers.34 
Coercive supervision was itself only one aspect of a generalized attempt by Wankie's new 
South African owners to re-enforce colonial production relations. From Anglo American's 
perspective, improved productivity in the "hand-got" sections also depended on limiting the 
degree of "self-regulation" enjoyed by lashers in determining the amount of work they did.35 
By initially turning the wartime shortage of white miners to their own advantage, the 
Colliery's underground labourers had successfully established their own output norms. 
"Over the years ... custom and usage ... [caused] the working week for lashing boys to fall to 
four days."36 At the same time, the size of their assigned daily task dwindled dramatically. 
In 1944, lashers "only cared . . . I to move] an average of 15 to 16 [tubs] per day of say 12 tons 
of coar.37 Five years on, as black labour too became increasingly scarce, underground 
workers had, in the eyes of management, to be "over-pampered.38 "The set up is this", a 
senior mine official explained in 1949: 
A lashing boy goes underground and must do a minimum of ten tubs per shift. That 
amounts to 8 1 /2  tons ... The standard here is ten. Supposing you stood over that 
native with a whip. he certainly would not do any more if he had made up his mind 
not to. All they go underground to do is to get over this distasteful work as quickly 
as they can - say this native finishes his ten tubs at ten o'clock, he is free to leave the 
mine. If we tried any forceful methods he would merely give notice.39 
Precluded by the shortage of labour from employing "forceful methods", both the old Wankie 
Colliery Company and Powell Duffryn had tried instead to manipulate the work situation by 
means of various bonus and piecework systems. One bonus system was reserved for gang 
foremen: "his first job is to get these ten tubs - out standard minimum. After that his job is 
to get as many more out of his lashing boys as possible. He does the running around ... the 
greater the number of tubs, the greater the bonus to the boss boy."40 According to 
management, this worked "very satisfactorily".41 The other system applied solely to the 
lashers themselves, but its results were decidely mixed. Workers were paid "2/ 1 for ten tubs, 
that was the standard day's work, then a bonus of 3d. for every tub above that". "During 
my time at the Wangi Kolia [Wankie Colliery] I was employed as an underground wagon boy 
[trammer] and then as a lasher", declared Likomena Nyambe. "As Africans we worked under 
the piece rate, for the ticket fell ill if one fellill ... We were paid for the number of truck loads 
of coal we could fill and haul in a day, three pennies per truck load, but if you were sick or 
slow the money was lost . . . We sold our bodies daily, tengisa rnzimba."42 
Although some workers had responded to this particular combination of carrot and stick in 
the way the Colliery's management had intended they should, most black miners had not. 
While a minority of lashers filled anything between 25 and 30 tubs daily, the great majority 
of underground labourers worked at  a considerably slower pace. The standard minimum of 
ten tubs was regularly exceeded but not by very much. By the end of the decade, when 
output had crept back to the 1944 level, "the average in both shafts ... [was] 15 tubs, taking 
the lashing boys all in all about seven hours. They commence at 7.30 a.m. and leave off 
normally at  2.45 p.m."43 Unimpressed experts from the Transvaal noted that for all that 
Wankie's management pronounced itself "satisfied" with this result, it represented less than 
13 tons per shift.44 It was, after all, a figure well below the "sixteen to nineteen tons per day 
shovelled by common labourers . . . [whether] studies in seventeenth century France, by early 
Victorian contractors of English nawies, [or] ... at the dawn of the twentieth century [in 
AmericajU.45 
There were several reasons why none of these bonus and piecework systems were 
particularly effective. As a rule, bonus systems tended to work best where the degree of 
control exercised by labourers over the labour process permitted them to maximize as well as 
minimize effort.46 On many mines in Central Africa, however, this was thwarted by 
company failure to provide the conditions necessary for the system's successful operation: 
The allocation of workers to ends was usually dictated by the shortage of labo[ulr 
rather than by the amount of work involved. Workers often had no chance of 
completing the assigned task by the end of the shift. There were frequent shortages 
of equipment, such as wheelbarrows ... Lashers might have to wait up to four hours 
before their ends were checked [sic] and work could begin. From time to time the 
system of air cooling would stop operating and all work had to ~ e a s e . 4 ~  
At Wankie, where similar conditions obtained, the only lashers for whom it made any sense 
to exert themselves for the duration of a nine-hour shift, were precisely those "on the 'small' 
high slopes where they don't have to wait for tubs ... [and therefore] lash as many as 35 
[tubs] which is about 28 tonsW.48 But elsewhere in the mine, the situation was very 
different. Most workers had to wait for lengthy periods at the start of each shift before they 
could begin work. On those days when they had time, it could take over-extended white 
miners hours to check their districts against possible rock fds.49 It could also take up to 
two hours for empty tubs to return underground. "The number of h b s  available was quite 
inadequate", the Wankie Coal Commission was told, "and the time lost by lashing boys 
hanging about for tubs lowered output and increased costs of production."50 Lashers who 
could "load a tub in about 20 minutes", had to put up with frequent "derailments and other 
stoppages caused by the irregular haulages". In January 1950, "the turn round of tubs on 
No. 1 [Colliery] averaged about 2 1 / 2  hours and on No. 2, 2 hours", necessitating 
considerable overtime, not least on Sundays.51 
Faced with an apparently intractable problem, the Wankie Colliery Company and Powell 
Duffryn had both blamed low output per manshift on what they insisted were the imutable 
physical and mental limitations of the Colliery's black labour force. "There is one factor 
which I think must account for the greater part of the difference [in output per manshift 
between Wankie and Transvaal collieries]", observed one of Powell Duffryn's mining 
engineers, "and that is that the underground workman at Wankie is what is known as  a 
tropical native, and the workmen in the Transvaal are largely not drawn from those areas... 
I feel there must be some inherent difference in the type of lasher used normally in the 
Transvaal and that working at  Wankie."52 The Colliery's underground manager was blunter 
still. "About this turnover of lashing boys, there is a little more in it than physical 
incapability", he argued. "The native, to the best of my knowledge, does not like hard work. 
We are importing raw unsophisticated Natives [from Rhodesia and Tanganyika] who 
volunteer to work for this work. It does not take them long to discover that in spite of high 
wages it is not worth it, so they leave us."53 "The Rhodesian native", declared Wankie's 
long-service compound manager, "has not yet developed any sense of economic dependence 
on his job, and large numbers are wandering round hoping to eventually find a job fairly 
well paid but involving little hard work, work being something naturally opposed to his 
inherent kraal training and instinct."54 
This attitude of resigned helplessness contrasted sharply with Anglo American's own 
reaction to the same situation. As racist to its carefully polished corporate core as any of 
its predecessors, the Johannesburg-based conglomerate's response was nonetheless severely 
practical. In the first place, it promptly cut down on the amount of time wasted at the 
beginning of each shift, by deploying more white miners to carry out safety, especially "shot 
firing" (blasting) inspections. In the interests of "efficiency, discipline, and safety", the area 
for which each white miner was responsible for checking was reduced in size.55 At the same 
time, Anglo American attempted to reshape the organization of lashing work in its own 
image. Drawing on its extensive South African experience, it introduced a quite differently 
designed mine tub. Compared to the old tubs which were 3 '9 high, with a capacity of 0.85 
tons, the new ones were 2'8" high, each having a capacity of 1.25 tons.56 "This new mine 
tub", claimed the Colliery's management, "was greater in capacity and larger in area but was 
of considerably lower design than the older lxb ... The new tub would therefore be easier to 
load and easier to handle."57 
Erom August 1953 onwards, preparations for the introduction of the new tubs moved into 
top gear. Alterations to the height of existing haulage ropes and tipplers were pushed 
ahead, and by November "one particular part of No. 2 Colliery" was ready. Confident that 
workers had been "more than adequately 'prepared' by the considerable amount of 
propaganda undertaken with, and through tribal representatives", Wankie's South African 
owners announced mid-way through the month that the new tubs would come into use the 
following week, on Friday 20 November. Lashers were told that they would be paid 4d 
instead of 3d per tub, "the extra payment to be made for each tub filled exactly 
compensating for the difference in size". This was immediately disputed by dozens of 
workers who had previously made a point of examining the new tubs "lying on the surface 
before they were commissioned", but real trouble only broke out after the flrst shift had gone 
underground "in order to try the tubs for themselves". Their suspicions were confirmed 
almost at once. As the realization dawned amongst those lashing gangs immediately 
affected by the change that they were expected to f a  tubs which were nearly half as big 
again as the old one for only a third more pay, angry voices were raised. And when workers 
discovered that the bearings of the new tubs were so stiff that they could anyway only be 
handled with great difficulty, their anger boiled over into strike action. More than 200 
lashers in No. 2 Colliery walked off the job, demanding a shilling per tub before they would 
return. They were joined by "some 40 jackhamer boys and boss boys".58 
Although it soon became clear that the strike was unlikely to spread, the Southern 
Rhodesian government left nothing to chance. The Minister of Native Affairs, accompanied 
by senior officials from his department, flew to Wankie "for consultations on the spot".59 
The Colliery was "already 40,000 tons down on their production", the cabinet heard, "and 
no disturbances could be contemplated which would make the position deteriorate still 
furtherW.6o Grateful to Anglo American for a "politic" decision not to pass on the latest 
small increase in the cost of producing coal to the colony's consumers,61 as well as for its 
l good offices in arranging for the Transvaal Coal Owners' Association to cover the current 
I shortfall in Central Africa's coal supply,62 the state was quick to assure Wankie's owners 
"that they could count on Government backingW.63 Indeed, Gaxfield Todd's administration, 
in office barely three months since Huggins' resignation to take up the reins of the interim 
federal government, was keen to demonstrate that it was as committed to the interests of big 
business as its predecessor.64 It consequently seized on "a suggestion by the Colliery 
Management .. . that the N[ativel L[abour] S[upply] C[ommission], who had a number of boys 
on the property, might be able to persuade them to take over the work on the new tubsw.% 
The general manager and the compound manager of the Supply Commission were both duly 
summoned to Wankie, where they eventually succeeded in exerting enough pressure on the 
Colliery's NLSC recruits, latter-day "chibaro boys", to break the strike. By the end of the f is t  
week in December it was over, the erstwhile strikers agreeing "to give the new working 
conditions a trial for a fortnight, and the Management to do their best to improve the track 
on which the tubs ran and to carry out other pieces of reorganization necessary to ensure 
smooth workingV.66 
While never wavering from a public position of support for Anglo American, the 
government's confidence in the South African mining house's judgement had actually been 
badly dented during the strike. Ministers were privately informed that despite protestations 
to the contrary, "it was obvious that the mine authorities had failed to condition the 
employees to the new operations and had neglected to ensure that the lasher boys were able 
to make full use of the new tubs and methods and had the coal to load ... There was no 
evidence of the presence of agitators." "When all these minor points were taken together", 
concluded the Minister of Native Affairs, "there was some justification for the attitude of the 
employees."~7 All that the government could persuade Anglo American to concede, 
however, was the "possibility of raising the bonus for fiing of tubs a little higher than the 
4d. which they had offeredW.68 But even this grudging half promise was soon withdrawn. 
After the trial period of 14 days agreed to by the strikers had not only passed off without 
incident, but had also resulted "in a daily average [per lasher] of 20 tons a s  against a 
l 
previous average of 13 tons with the old tubs", the Colliery's management first toyed with 
the idea of restricting any extra payment to "those f i ed  over the average of 20", and then 
decided against any increase at all.69 Satisfied that the new system was "proving extremely 
successful", and bolstered by the knowledge that "the 3rd shaft had just been opened, 
Anglo American declared its intention of "turning out 10,000 tons of coal a day in 
4 
January". 70 
In the weeks which followed Anglo American's confident announcement, the introduction 
l of new tubs to other sections of the mine went ahead steadily. By mid-January 1954 all of No. 2 and most of No. 1 Colliery had been converted to the new system. Disdaining 
I confidential advice from several government departments that their "intelligence service was 
weak and ... their Compound Police system in need of reorganization", Wankie's 
management even refused "to keep the Native Commissioner familiar with working 
conditions from time to tirnew.71 Instead, Braithwaite and Rautenbach relied heavily on the 
Colliery's "tribal elders" for information. These latter were men who invariably took a 
cautious and conservative approach to the minor compound problems which were allowed 
to fall within their ambit. They were also usually careful to tell the compound manager 
what they thought he wanted to hear. But although still in vogue on the Rand and on a 
number of Transvaal collieries, the sytem of tribal representation was in fact already utterly 
discredited closer to home. On the Copperbelt, black miners had recently and 
overwhelmingly rejected so-called "elders" in a secret ballot conducted by the Northern 
Rhodesian Chamber of Mines itself.72 In a period when even the Southern Rhodesian 
government was edging towards legislation which would recognize "Native Workers" 
Associations", if not yet trade unions,73 Wankie's "tribal representative medium" was 
increasingly detached from reality.74 At the very moment that tribal elders were informing 
Colliery officials that "the new tub was daily becoming more popular", the great majority of 
Wankie's black workforce was coming to quite different conclusions.~~ 
Uppermost in many workers' thoughts was the question of wages. Compared to the 
abysmal levels obtaining elsewhere in the Southern Rhodesian mining industry, Wankie's 
black labourers were fairly well paid. In 1953 monthly cash wages on the Colliery averaged 
82s 8d. Other Southern Rhodesian miners could only expect an average of 63s 5d. per 
month. By Copperbelt standards, though, Wankie's workers had plenty to complain about. 
Late in 1952, a strike by the African Mineworkers" Union (of Northern Rhodesia) had 
eventually gone to arbitration and ultimately won a substantial pay increase.77 At the 
start of 1954, "the average money wage in Northern Rhodesian mining was more than 
double that paid in the mining industry of Southern RhodesiaW.78 
TABLE 1. AVERAGE MONTHLY CASH WAGES: COAL 
COMPARED TO OTHER MINERALS. 1945- 195376 
But local wages not only looked small by comparison. They were also beginning to shrink 
in size. Despite increases in 1948, 195 1 and again in 1952, black miners' wages were no 
higher in real terms than they had been before the Second World War. Temporary gains 
were constantly eroded by inflation. Between 1949 and 1954 the cost of living was officially 
calculated as having risen by 28 per cent. For African households the increase was 
certainly bigger.79 and for most of Wankie's workers this fact of life made it essential that 
their basic earnings were supplemented by frequent infusions of overtime pay, especially 
Sunday shifts. In the recent past, they had done so by regulating the piecework system to 
their own satisfaction. Unwilling to work at  management's pace, they nonetheless regularly 
exceeded the old basic minimum by five tubs each shift.80 At 3d. per tub, this added up to 
an extra 1s. 3d. per day. They had also been able to count on working Sunday shifts at 
double time during Powell Duffryn's frantic struggle to expand the Colliery's output. Yet all 
of these sources of much-needed additional income were now being threatened by Anglo 
American's relentless reorganization of production. "The number of Sunday shifts worked 
had been reduced considerably during the past year", noted the Colliery's mine manager in 
January 1954. "Whereas in January, 1953, on an average 4,000 Sunday shifts were 
worked, today the average is less than, 2,000." "In the old days", he added, "the period 
worked was markedly less than a full shift, and by custom the native received payment for a 
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full shift at double time. This has changed. Further, the issue of special bonuses has come 
under greater control, resulting in the elimination of unjustified payrnents."82 
For underground workers, in particular, this was the last straw. Black miners coming off 
night shift early on the morning of 25 January clustered around a notice posted "at the 
shaft head at  No. 1 Colliery ... advising them to come out on strike on 1st February". 
Identical notices appeared the next morning, and still others "encouraging natives to strike" 
began passing from lasher to lasher "in the underground workings at No. 1 Colliery". News 
of a meeting to be held late on Wednesday afternoon spread by word of mouth at the same 
time. It was attended by hundreds of workers, most of whom "listened for a while and then 
moved on". Their places were immediately filled by hundreds more. They heard a 
succession of speakers, none of whom "were known 'trouble makers' or agitators", call for 
"more money". Unless this demand was met, declared one speaker, identified by the mine 
authorities only as  "Michael, a Mulala [lla] native", "there would be a strike of all workers on 
1st February, next Monday . . . which everyone should support . . . 'Measures' would be taken 
to see that none of the leaders were molested in any way and if they were, there was to be 
retribution. Provided no violence was offered by the Europeans, no violence would be 
resorted to by the nativesW.83 
Similar meetings were held on each of the following three days. All of them took place in 
No. 1 compound, and all of them shared what the management sourly called "a 'migratory' 
characteristic". Word of the impending strike was being carried to every corner of the 
Colliery. Indeed, the effect of this "two-legged propaganda [sic] spread from previous 
gatherings" ensured huge turn-outs at  successive meetings on Saturday afternoon and 
Sunday morning, when most workers were free to attend. Crowds of over 3,000 people 
cheered "Michael" on as he demanded "more money". Specifically, this meant "a 31- 
increase per shift worked; increments to be increased from 5/ - to 7 / 6; an end to 'maxima' in 
grades and categories of pay; and cash instead of rations". A message conveyed by "a 
Senior Police boy" to the effect that the Compound Manager was "in his office and prepared 
to meet a delegation", was rejected on the grounds that "delegates would be victimized". 
This suspicion was doubtless well-founded. Strikes were illegal under the Master and 
Servants Ordinance. Instead, the meeting determined to mobilize as  many people as  
possible in support of strike action, and on Sunday evening "a series of meetings were held 
in No. 2 Compound ... [These] were addressed by certain agitators from No. 1 Compound, 
and representatives from No. 3 Compound were presentW.84 
Speakers in favour of striking work the next day were generally well-received. While initial 
support for strike action had come overwhelmingly from lashers and gang foremen ("boss 
boys"), many of whom feared that the new work regime would result in their pay packets 
shrinking dramatically unless they worked themselves to the bone, they were subsequently 
joined by thousands of workers in other job categories.85 Underground labourers as a whole 
were unhappy with their rudimentary and usually dangerous working conditions. About 
six months before Anglo American assumed control of the Colliery, Powell Duffryn's Wankie 
management had been told by government inspectors to do something about the "utter lack 
of sanitation and hygiene arrangement in the underground sections". "The smell of human 
faeces is evident in many parts of the underground workings and the lack of proper facilities 
is responsible for this", insisted an official letter to the general manager. "The old workings 
are being extensively used and if some serious consideration is not given to the subject, 
especially as tropical natives are employed and hot humid conditions prevailing, the danger 
of hookworm spreading will add further to your already large amount of man-hours lost 
through accidents and sickness".86 But this elementary advice had simply been ignored by 
both Powell Duffryn and Anglo American. As far a s  the latter was concerned, the 
"requirements of the development programme" came first.87 Hookworm and other parasitic 
diseases, already carried by at  least 50 per cent of new arrivals from North of the Zambezi, 
asumed "epidemic" proportions as  they began to infect "long-service boys". By the time of 
the strike, hygienic conditions underground were "nothing less than shocking". A subdued 
Cabinet later agreed that "there could be no justification whatever for the Company's lack of 
interest".88 
Nor was Wankie's South African management particularly interested in mine safety. 
Although Anglo American lost no time in "fixing up" the mess left behind by Powell 
Duffryn.89 it did so in the explicit context of trying to increase the Colliery's output.90 
While the closer inspection of blasting operations by a bigger number of white miners caused 
the number of fatal accidents to decline after 1954, the Company's initial concern had been 
iess with the accident rate per se,  than with finding a more efficient means at the start of 
each shift of discharging its legal obligations under the safety regulations of the Mines and 
Minerals Act.91 Other safety measures, by comparison, were cursorily enforced and 
extremely rough-and-ready in practice. "The high hanging [roof] was very dangerous and 
virtually impossible to examine properly", remembered one white miner. "We carried wooden 
poles to test whether the roof made a 'drumming' sound ... if it did, it was about to fallV.92 
Encouraged by a bonus system which placed a premium on speed while penalizing caution, 
this casual attitude resulted in "extremely dangerous mining": "because of piecework, no- 
one would stop to check the hanging waK.93 "Three times in a week there were casualties 
and deaths", recalled a former "boss boyV.94 "Nearly every day there were rockfalls leading to 
injuries and deaths", said Daniel Nyambe, a "timber boy" on the Colliery in the early 1950s. 
"Africans mainly suffered because they were the ones actually involved in labour ... When 
, we went on strike we wanted higher pay, [but] many [also] felt that the whites were killing 
them deliberately."95 
But if the underground workers had reasons enough of their own to contemplate strike 
action, they also harboured grievances which affected everyone regardless of whether they 
worked below or above ground. Most black miners were thoroughly fed up with their run- 
down and overcrowded living quarters. By the beginning of 1954, Wankie's mine 
conlpounds, covering a combined area of over 250 acres, contained an  estimated 17,500 
men, women and children.96 The number of black workers a t  the Colliery had been growing 
by about a thousand or so each year since the second half of 1949 when the first of several 
programmes to expand production had been initiated. During 1950 the total figure climbed 
from 5,666 in January to 6,789 in December, and by the end of 1951 Wankie was employing 
7,912 black labourers. Eighteen months later it had more than 9,500 Africans on its 
books.97 Yet this rapid increase in the size of Wankie's black labour force had not been 
accompanied by anything like a commensurate increase in the size of its housing stock. 
Like the old Wankie Colliery Company before them, both Powell Duffryn and Anglo 
American had expressly subordinated the provision of welfare to the expansion of 
production. Workers' housing was a long way down their list of priorities. "Due to the large 
increase in the [black] labour strength, necegsary to meet the increased demand for coal". 
explained Anglo American, "no headway has been made in overcoming the overcrowding 
problem."98 
As  a result of deliberate neglect, the Colliery's compounds on the eve of the strike comprised 
an unsightly mixture of dilapidated barracks or "hostels", corrugated iron kaytor huts, 
"temporary" pole and daga buildings, and a smattering of "superior" houses especially built 
for a limited number of relatively senior married employees. First introduced towards the 
end of the 1920s.99 this particular building scheme had foundered initially on the 
Depression, and latterly on the urgent priority accorded to meeting the capital cost of 
mechanization. Such surplus cash as occasionally turned up tended to go into building 
houses for white artisans, leaving only derisory sums for black accommodation. In 1953, 
while "the European housing programme was pressed forward with all speed . . . and as  many 
as  12 houses were completed per month",loo the construction of African accommodation 
languished. The few houses that were grudginlgy built were hopelessly inadequate: "just a 
room and kitchen and porch.101 They did not begin to meet the needs of married workers, 
whose families slept six and seven in a room.102 but even they were infinitely preferable to 
the sordid conditions endured by single labourers. "We were cramped in crowded rooms 
with open lavatories, not less than 20 people were heaped in a room", one worker said.103 
"The sibonda se njini was responsible for order in the room, ...[ but] some occupants stole 
from the others ... drunkards, thieves, people of varied characters were made to live 
together. "104 
Many black workers were also increasingly irritated by Anglo American's paternalistic 
insistence on rations rather than cash. Although the Colliery's owners were adamant that 
"having regard to the type of labour employed and the conditions prevailing at  Wankie ... 
the Company policy is correct and the demand made by the Natives in this regard should 
not be acceded",los other industrial concerns had begun to change their ways. In December 
1953 several large Bulawayo firms agreed to pay workers cash in lieu of rations, and news of 
this concession was not long in reaching Wankie.106 For labourers pinched by the rising 
cost of living, and squeezed by Anglo American's determination to end what it perceived as 
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"abuses" of the bonus system, the prospect of extra cash from any source was attractive. 
Not every one agreed, of course, and some miners were reluctant to forgo the convenience of 
drawing rations directly from the Company.107 But what tipped the balance in the opinion 
of many compound dwellers was precisely the difficulty which more and more people 
encountered in trying to obtain their fair share. According to Syela Mulemba, "the problem 
was uneven distribution of food rations, so the people demanded money to buy food for 
themselves."loa "There were times when the men came back from work and found that all 
the rations had been shared, recalled Ma-Nyambe Sitali, who had gone to live with her 
husband at "Wangi Kolia" in June 1952. "The officials could have dished out enough food, 
but some unscrupulous ones cheated on these rations ... so we called for money."loQ 
Despite the fact that these grievances, especially "the cry for more money", were repeatedly 
voiced at all three meetings held over the weekend immediately before the strike, the 
Colliery's management refused to believe that the call for action enjoyed widespread 
support.110 While information gathered by the mine authorities claimed that waverers were 
whipped into line by assaults and death threats, and were later kept in place by particularly 
robust picketing,lll such other evidence a s  there is, suggests that support for the strike not 
only stretched across different job categories but also across lines of ethnicity and gender. 
For most of Wankie's history, its black labour force had been drawn very largely from north 
of the Zambezi. Statistics collected in 1950 revealed that about 4,000 out of a total of 
c.6.500 workers were from Northern Rhodesia. Other Central African sources, including 
Angola and Tanganyika, supplied a little under 1,000 men. About 450 labourers came from 
Nyasaland, and less than 100 from Mozambique. Southern Rhodesian Africans comprised 
only some 12 per cent of the labour force.112 But for all that Native Department officials 
busily calculated that these broad divisions could be broken down even further into "no less 
than 38 tribal groups present at the Colliery",ll3 the workers themselves completely ignored 
the so-called "tribal representatives" foisted on them by Anglo American: "no complaints of 
claims were put forward through themW.ll4 Nor did a list of strike leaders subsequently 
compiled by the British South Africa Police point to any significant ethnic dimension to the 
strike. On the contrary, it underscored the extent to which the strike was led by long- 
service, relatively skilled workers, particularly "boss boys" who numbered seven out of the 
23 "leaders and speakers", and short-term, usually unskilled labourers alike.115 
Predictably, all of them were men. But if the strike leadership was exclusively male, rank- 
and-file support was not. On the Colliery's own reckoning, c.40 per cent of its black labour 
force was attempting to lead some kind of settled family existence. Thousands of women 
lived more or less permanently with husbands or lovers in Wankie's sprawling 
compounds.ll6 "Wives" whose "daily tasks included preparing meals for [their] husband, 
cleaning the house and washing their husband's job clothes e.g. overalls, trousers, boots 
and the hard hat, impahla e mgodine", also attended twice-weekly classes in "housecraft 
and childkeeping" organized by "the office of the Compound ManagerV.l 17 "As a woman I 
benefited a lot", admitted Ma-Nyambe Sitali. "I learnt better ways of cooking and things like 
knitting socks and mending clothes. Women who did well in these courses such as Bo 
Manjekwa, Mrs Nalishebo Sikweti and others I cannot remember now were rewarded with 
sewing machines and money."llS "We were also encouraged by the Compound [manager] to 
take our children below the age of five regularly to the clinic for check-ups and weighing", 
acknowledged Saela Mulema. "As a result of this I never lost one of my thirteen 
children."llQ 
For some women, these newly-acquired skills opened up the prospect of financial 
independence, and for this reason and doubtless others a s  well, not all of them were 
prepared to denounce the Colliery's compound management. "Women who tried to dodge 
the protest were forced under the pain of a beating to join .. . Bo Majekwa was almost beaten 
for refusing at  first."lzo For the majority of women, though, courses in "better" 
housekeeping and childrearing seemingly served to reinforce gender roles, while 
simultaneously strengthening the form of patriarchy under construction in compound 
society. Authority lost by male elders in the countryside was differently reconstituted by 
male heads of mine households. Although the evidence is patchy in the extreme it does 
provide one or two glimpses of the compound's female inhabitants being mobilized, initially 
at least, through channels of male control.121 "We were all urged by the men to march on 
the offices of the Compound Manager", recalled one miner's wife.122 "Our menfolk led the 
way", said another.123 Yet once mobilized, most women made it clear that the grinding 
realities of compound life affected them as much if not more than they affected men. "As 
the [food] shortages became worse, there grew out a wide cry ... Lozie women and other 
women from other tribes joined their men in demanding money."l24 One of the most 
noticeable aspects of the strike, observed a senior police officer, "was the large number of 
women and children integrated in the huge crowds".l25 
The upshot of all this was a "total strike [which] became effective on the morning of Monday 
1st February". It included not only miners but also domestic workers and shop assistants. 
"The only natives working", reported Anglo American were 
i )  those employed in the hospital; ii) those employed by the Railways and 
Government; iii) those employed by the Zambezi pumping station who had had no 
contact with the agitators; iv) the employees of two contractors who were later on 
Monday morning intimidated into strike action; v) 20 or so loyal mine employees at 
No. 2 Colliery; [and] vi) the employees of a trader who operated Eating Houses (food 
stores) in the No. 1 and No. 2 Compounds. 126 
While strike leaders busied themselves with shoring up the miners' solidarity at "meetings 
held in No. 1 and No. 2 Compounds comtemporaneously", government officials on the spot 
soon discovered that Anglo American was in no mood to negotiate either. According to a 
Colliery Company report on the strike, when the local Native Commissioner advised the 
strikers that their action "was illegal, that a delegation should be appointed and that there 
should be a return to work", the reply was that "only if the Management would attend the 
meeting agree to the demands made, would the strikers return to work". "The 
management was strongly pressed by the Native Commissioner to visit the meeting and to 
negotiate", added the report, "but, with the agreement of the Consulting Engineers of the 
Company, the Management refused to do this since it was irregular and might have 
compromised the Company if proper negotiations could be established."l27 
Unimpressed by Anglo American's sense of what was proper, the Southern Rhodesian 
government was watching the unfolding events at Wankie with mounting alarm. As stocks 
of mined coal were "sufficient only for a few days" consumption, a quick return to work was 
needed ... moreover, it was felt that serious labour unrest would affect the new Federal 
Government's ability to raise loans on the London MarketW.l2* Todd's administration 
"immediately invoked its new Peace Preservation Amendment Act which gave the police 
wide powers to restore order, including imposing curfews and searching without 
warrants".l2Q Rhodesia Railways were instructed to "cut their goods trains by more than 
half in order to conserve their limited stocks of coal and so ensure the maintenance of 
essential servicesW.l3o Steps were taken to bring the Northern Rhodesian Chamber of Mines, 
concerned by the fact that there was less than seven days' supply of coal on the Copperbelt, 
fully into the picture;l31 and most dramatically of all, Todd himself, accompanied by the 
Minister of Native Affairs, flew to Wankie to take personal control of the situation. "The 
Southern Rhodesian Government", announced Todd, "was determined to go on producing 
coal at Wankie with whatever labour was available, and was not prepared to have Wankie 
close down because of an illegal strike."l32 
On their arrival at the Colliery on Tuesday morning, the Prime Minister and his entourage 
were promptly briefed on the latest developments. An output of about 2,400 tons per day 
was being produced from the mechanized sections of No. 2 shaft by a skeleton staff of white 
miners, and arrangements had been made to bring in further "European" workers from other 
mines in the Colony. These eventually totalled "about 170 men, and it was expected that 
with them, the colliery would be able to raise about 4,000 tons of coal a day, ... enough to 
meet essential needsW.l33 At the same time, the Copperbelt was asked to stand ready "to 
find 400 European volunteers to work Wankie". 134 The strikers themselves were refusing all 
mine rations, and had ordered stores in the compounds to close. They were feeding 
themselves by "picking many of the mealies [maize] they planted some months ago and 
which were now ripeningW.l35 Earlier in the day, a noisy protest by hundreds of women 
outside the Compound Manager's office had gone off peacefully,l36 but the arrest of 26 
pickets at No. 2 Colliery shortly afterwards had almost precipitated a major clash between 
strikers and police. "Immediately after the arrest, 5,000 Natives from No. 2 Colliery started a 
march on the township and Magistrate's office", recounted a government statement issued 
once the strike was over. "Between the two collieries they were diverted by a very 
commendable action on the part of Captain Brewer", who it was later explained, 
then had a hasty conference. and proceeded to meet the congregation at the football 
field. The Native Commissioner opened his remarks by telling the mass that certain 
pickets had been arrested and lodged in the cells at the police station, but. as the 
strikers had behaved themselves so well otherwise, he had decided to release the 
pickets. He again warned them that picketing would not be allowed. This wise action 
had a very favourable reception from the vast majority of the concourse ... The 
pickets were thereupon released at No. 2 Colliery.138 
Brewer's quick thinking had been prompted by the unpalatable knowledge that he had 
barely 100 policemen at his disposal. Police reinforcements were on their way from 
Salisbury, as well as from Northern Rhodesia, but neither contingent was expected to reach 
the Colliery before Wednesday. In these circumstances, prudence had dictated retreat in the 
face of the huge crowd of strikers. But although Brewer's superior officers hastened to 
assure their distinguished audience that everything was now "under control and the limited 
production was not being hampered, the Prime Minister would have none of it.139 He 
insisted on mobilizing members of the Southern Rhodesian Territorial Force. All in all, four 
companies of white reservists, plus two armoured cars, were ordered to Wankie, and a 
further company of the Rhodesian African Rifles held in reserve at Bulawayo. This meant 
that "when all the Territorial troops had arrived, the security forces [including police] at the 
Collieries would number 7 10".140 "We took . . . [this] decision", Todd subsequently informed 
the Legislative Assembly, because "every able-bodied European man, not only on the mines 
but on the Railways and the various contractors" gangs around Wankie, was down the pits. 
Even the clerks had left their desks and gone down the pits and the women and children 
were left really, you might say without any European males on the surface, and the 
position was a dangerous 0ne."l41 "The position", pronounced the Minister of Native 
Affairs, "was that there were some 16,000 natives involved, and the No. 1 Colliery 
compound is right up against the European suburb. The mass of these natives are more 
primitive than the labour force in any other part of Southern Rhodesia in that they come 
from the backwoods of the north. In that number there must be some liable to do anything 
in a state of excitement. There are epileptics and all kinds and conditions of nature 
there." 142 
Having demonstrated his "decisiveness and lack of inhibition in calling out [the] Territorial 
Army7',143 to the general satisfaction of the settler electorate, Todd hurried back to Salisbury 
and the celebrations surrounding the opening of the federal parliament. But for all its 
public posturing, the Southern Rhodesian government was keen to resolve the dispute 
speedily and, if at  alI possible, peacefully. Ministers readily conceded that "during the whole 
of the strike we had at the back of our minds the need for coal production".l*4 Privately 
dismissive of Anglo American's disingenuous claim that "the agitators had no substantial 
grievances or complaints", 145 the senior government officials remaining at  Wankie after the 
Prime Minister had left, tried repeatedly to open discussions with the strikers. This was not 
easy. Strike leaders were no more willing to identify themselves at this stage than they had 
been previously. Attempts to negotiate with the strikers late on Tuesday afternoon, during 
the whole of Wednesday, and again on Thursday morning, all came to nothing. On each 
occasion, "most of the strikers ... indicated that they were not prepared to go back to work 
until their demands were met". 146 Even if not intended to be taken literally, the message 
from "several big meetings" called by the striking miners themselves, was always the same: 
"they would stay in their compounds for seven days and would not have any discussions 
with Europeans during that timeW.147 The silence which followed a speech by the Native 
Commissioner early on Thursday morning was broken by the blowing of whistles and 
shouts of "mali kupela (money only), mali kupela": "amid cheering and shouting, half of 
them [out of a crowd of c.2,0001 moved off to the compound to get their situpas (passes]. 
They wanted to be signed off, they said, if they did not get their 'rise' immediately. Mali 
kupela. "148 
From that point onwards, however, the strikers' resolve began to weaken. Earlier signs of 
dissention in their ranks had been contained easily enough. At one of Tuesday's meetings, 
a lone voice advocated an unconditional return to work and had been abruptly silenced by 
a barrage of blows and kicks, and the potentially unsettling effect on the strikers' morale of 
the action by "a group of 60 workers, most of them recruited from Nyasaland . .. [who] went 
to the mine administration on Wednesday morning and stated they were not interested in 
the strike and wanted to be signed off', had been off-set later in the day by a huge 
demonstration at  which thousands of miners "threw their tickets [contracts] into a 44- 
gallon drum", by way of symbolizing their rejection of the Colliery Company.149 But not 
much could be done about the fact that the strikers were running out of food. Since the 
closure of the compound stores on Monday, "some Natives had been going as far as Dett, 
about 30 miles from Wankie, to buy food, but this was not a realistic option for the vast 
majority of people.150 Nor could the miners' "mealie patches" [maize gardens] sustain them 
for very long. And while Todd was undoubtedly premature in claiming on Wednesday 
morning that "some of the Africans are getting weary and hungry and are beginning to 
worry about their pay",l51 many of them were certainly worried a day or two later by the 
growing military forces arrayed against them. "The whites came with soldiers and armoured 
cars", remembered one black striker. "They threatened to shoot us  all."l52 "Calling out the 
Defence Force to intimidate the strikers was wrong", declared Jack Keller, organized white 
labour's last remaining voice in the Legislative Assembly. "It is undemocratic. It is 
dictatorial and it must have a bad effect on the native labourers themselves, not only at  
Wankie, but in all other parts of the country."l53 
For its part, Todd's administration was now ready to push matters to a conclusion. With 
the military build-up complete, the compounds could be extensively patrolled on a 24-hour 
basis "by groups comprizing three to four Europeans and six African Constables operating 
with radio vehicles."l54 Soldiers seemed t o  be everywhere. Strikers invariably gathered 
under the unblinking gaze of armed men. During Thursday morning's meeting, for example, 
"a company of the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Rhodesia Regiment, armed with rifles, and 
B.S.A. Police riot squads stood by. The police included a detachment of African constables, 
who were steel-helmeted, and carried shields and batons."l55 Satisfied that it had the 
means to enforce an end to the strike, the government issued an ultimatum late on 
Thursday afternoon. A huge crowd of more than 5,000 men and women, "standing on the 
hill which slopes away from the [No. 1 compound] offices and into the location",l56 heard 
the local Native Commissioner deliver a message from the Minister of Native Affairs. 
Speaking through a police loudhailer, the Native Commissioner told the crowd that 
these are the final words of the Government. They will not tolerate an illegal strike. 
You have behaved yourselves and nobody has been hurt ... The police and military 
are here to protect everybody, and are your friends as long as you behave yourselves. 
Any disturbances will be severely dealt with. The Government has decided to send 
five or six Europeans from Bulawayo ... This labour board will deal with your 
troubles. They will come here to listen to your complaints to the Government. You 
can appoint your committees or deputations to speak to these men. These men will 
be here within the next 14 days. It will be best for you now to go back to work, and 
the police will protect you. Those who do not wish to work will be signed off, and 
must leave the district immediately ... I want to make this quite clear: those who 
want to work may do so and nobody will interfere. Those who do not want to work 
will come here at 6.30 and will be signed off. That is all. Think on this thing - this is 
a big thing - come back tomorrow with your decision.157 
The strikers reacted to what they had just heard with a mixture of apprehension and 
defiance. No sooner had the Native Commission finished speaking than "the military 
appeared on the scene .. . to stage a well-timed flag marchW.l58 Some workers decided there 
and then that for them the strike was over. Several hundred miners indicated their 
willingness to return to work immediately. Most of the others, presumably those who had 
constantly interrupted the Native Commissioner's speech with "cries and catcalls", were less 
readily intimidated, however. But even as they slowly moved back to their compounds, 
many of them "shaking their heads", it was clear to the watching officials that "the mob was 
now disorganized and there was an indication of a general sofc-ning".lsQ Just before the 
meeting, the strike leaders had been forced to climb down ov.- the closure of the various 
stores in No. 1 and No. 2 compounds, and request that they be re-opened.160 Almost 
everyone had run out of food, and by Friday morning, 5 February, "a 'drift' back to work had 
started, resulting largely from the fact that the strikers were starting to get hungry". 161 The 
minds of those who were still undecided were concentrated by a police sweep through the 
Colliery "in which all strikers who asked to be signed off were removed from the compounds 
to an assembly point on the railway line, from where they would be sent by special train to 
Northern Rhodesia". 162 In the event, only c.300 workers took the train north, compared to 
the thousands who sullenly agreed that the strike was over.163 Their temper was hardly 
improved by the arrest of four strike "ringleaders", but the police, "acting on certain 
information received, had accurately gauged the strikers' mood and ther arrests "were made 
without a murmur from the surrounding nativesW.l64 "The situation at Wankie this week - 
end had been almost normal", reported the Rhodesia Herald. "The special shift worked on 
Sunday was considered to serve the double purpose of increasing production and keeping 
the Africans occupied at a time when the strike has not entirely left their minds. It is 
confidently expected, though, that they will now wait quietly for the Board of Inquiry to be 
set up."16" 
But Wankie's black miners were far from finished. Forced back to work, they proceeded to 
stage a two-month "go-slow", initially for the duration of the Labour Board's deliberations, 
and eventually until Anglo American agreed to implement the recommended wage increases. 
In exerting pressure on their normally unyeilding South African employer, the Colliery's 
labourers were greatly helped by a stroke of luck. Early in March "a most serious state of 
mining conditions suddenly presented itself in an area of No. 2 Colliery, where all working 
faces encountered faulting. Owing to the dangerous ground almost the whole of available 
faces had to be temporarily abandoned."l66 This "unexpected difficulty", reported the 
chairman of the Colliery Company, "occurred at a most inopportune moment when we were 
in the throes of completing the remodelling and reorganization of the underground layout 
and mining operations at  No. 1 Colliei-y", with the net result that coal production 
plunged.167 Nor could any relief be anticipated from No. 3 Colliery. Embarrassed company 
executives explained that "the new Colliery had been expected to be producing in April but 
owing to lack of artisans it was not expected now that production on any reasonably large 
scale would start until about the end of June". By the beginning of April, the coal shortage 
was already "severe", and four weeks later it was "highly probable that the Union [of South 
Africa] Government would again be approached to render assistance by supplying more coal 
to Central Africa". "I am told by the Southern Rhodesia Minister of Mines", wrote the South 
African High Commissioner in Salisbury, "that the difficulties being experienced at Wankie 
will have serious repercussions on the Central African economy and that for some months 
to come the situation will be grave."l6Q 
Fully aware of the pressing need to restore the Colliery's "African labour force to full 
efficiencyW,l7O the four members of the Wankie Regional Native Labour board sweated to 
produce a report at short order. Its recommended across-the-board pay increase of five 
shillings per month was well below the strikers' more unrealistic demands, but was 
nonetheless welcomed by the Colliery's black workers.171 The Board also condemned the 
poor state of Wankie's African housing and hospital facilities, remarking in passing that "it 
seemed to be inexplicable how the health authorities had failed to enforce their 
recommendations in the pastW.l72 It was particularly critical of the break-down in 
communication between management and labour both before and during the strike and 
suggested that thought should be given either to extending any proposed recognition of 
African labour organizations to the mining industry, or, at  the very least, ways of improving 
Wankie's system of "tribal representation" should be found. Agreeing that it needed to 
establish "good industrial relations and provide a willing and productive labour-force", the 
Cabinet began re-drafting its proposed Native Industrial Workers Union Bill along the lines 
suggested, Todd himself having publicly announced some weeks previously that "it was time 
to reconsider the recognition of the African trade unionsW.l73 
None of this appealed very much to the Anglo American Corporation, but having been 
obliged by force of geological circumstance to f d  back on labour intensive methods of "hand - 
loadingn in order to keep output from dropping further, it finally gave way and raised the 
wages of its black work force on 14 April.174 Insisting at every opportunity that "no wage 
award should have been recommended by the ... Board or approved by the Government", 175 
the Corporation resolved to dig in its heels and, indeed, claw back whatever it could. It 
began by persuading the cabinet that "as the Company had expensive plans in hand for 
improving conditions in the industry", the Labour Board's report should not be published, 
not least because "publication might lead to unnecessarily adverse comment overseas". 176 
This small success was soon afterwards followed by the blunt announcement that "having 
regard to all the misfortunes which have fallen on the colliery during the last financial 
year", the average selling price of coal was being raised immediately "by one shilling per ton, 
making the figure 19/3d per ton at  the pits-mouth.177 At much the same time, Anglo 
American's friends started lobbying the government for permission "to staff No. 3 Colliery 
with indentured Nyasaland natives". "The Colliery's reasons", the Cabinet was discretely 
informed, "were that they thought indentured labour would be more reliable in times of 
trouble and could be called upon to keep essential services goingW.l78 And in case there was 
any doubt about the lessons it had learnt from the strike, Anglo American also began 
marshalling its formidable resources to counter any suggestion that official recognition 
should be extended to a black miners' union. "The superimposition of Native Industrial 
Workers' Unions upon existing channels of communication", trumpeted the Colliery's 
General Manager in January 1955, "would serve only to weaken the existing medium of 
negotiation and communication between workers and Management, taking due regard of 
the characteristic [sic] of the labour force at Wankie."l79 "The whites at Wankie then were 
as dull as stagnant water", declared a former clerk. "They would not acknowledge the black 
man."l80 
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